Krizė tęsis ilgai
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Ten principles for a Black Swan-proof world
2. No socialisation of losses and privatisation of gains. Whatever may need to be bailed out should be nationalised; whatever does not need a bail-out should be free, small and risk-bearing. We have managed to combine the worst of capitalism and socialism. In France in the 1980s, the socialists took over the banks. In the US in the 2000s, the banks took over the government. This is surreal.
Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup
Looking just at the financial crisis (and leaving aside some problems of the larger economy), we face at least two major, interrelated problems. The first is a desperately ill banking sector that threatens to choke off any incipient recovery that the fiscal stimulus might generate. The second is a political balance of power that gives the financial sector a veto over public policy, even as that sector loses popular support.
(…) At the root of the banks’ problems are the large losses they have undoubtedly taken on their securities and loan portfolios. But they don’t want to recognize the full extent of their losses, because that would likely expose them as insolvent. So they talk down the problem, and ask for handouts that aren’t enough to make them healthy (again, they can’t reveal the size of the handouts that would be necessary for that), but are enough to keep them upright a little longer. This behavior is corrosive: unhealthy banks either don’t lend (hoarding money to shore up reserves) or they make desperate gambles on high-risk loans and investments that could pay off big, but probably won’t pay off at all. In either case, the economy suffers further, and as it does, bank assets themselves continue to deteriorate—creating a highly destructive vicious cycle.
(…) Our future could be one in which continued tumult feeds the looting of the financial system, and we talk more and more about exactly how our oligarchs became bandits and how the economy just can’t seem to get into gear.
The second scenario begins more bleakly, and might end that way too. But it does provide at least some hope that we’ll be shaken out of our torpor. It goes like this: the global economy continues to deteriorate, the banking system in east-central Europe collapses, and—because eastern Europe’s banks are mostly owned by western European banks—justifiable fears of government insolvency spread throughout the Continent. Creditors take further hits and confidence falls further. The Asian economies that export manufactured goods are devastated, and the commodity producers in Latin America and Africa are not much better off. A dramatic worsening of the global environment forces the U.S. economy, already staggering, down onto both knees. The baseline growth rates used in the administration’s current budget are increasingly seen as unrealistic, and the rosy “stress scenario” that the U.S. Treasury is currently using to evaluate banks’ balance sheets becomes a source of great embarrassment.
Under this kind of pressure, and faced with the prospect of a national and global collapse, minds may become more concentrated.
The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump “cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.” This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression—because the world is now so much more interconnected and because the banking sector is now so big.
Until the authorities are ready to draw a clear line between the existing banks in western Europe and the USA, – many or even most of which are surplus to requirements and have become parasitic entities feeding off the tax payer – and the substantive economic activity of bank lending to non-financial enterprises and households, there will not be a robust, sustained recovery.
Cituojami žmonės – prestižinių aukštųjų mokyklų profesoriai – sėkmingas finansininkas ir kultinės knygos autorius, buvęs aukšto rango TVF funkcionierius, FT finansinis apžvalgininkas, anksčiau dirbęs ERPB vedančiuoju ekonomistu. Tezės labai aiškios – tol, kol finansų sektoriaus nuostoliai bus socializuojami, pasaulio ekonomika neatsigaus. Jeigu niekas nepasikeis, pasauliui gresia scenarijus, blogesnis už Didžiąją depresiją.
Didieji bankai sukaupė per daug rizikos ir nuostolių, kuriuos gina visuomenės sąskaita, naudodamiesi per didele politine įtaka. Paliekant nuošalėje teisingumo aspektus (autoriai nenaudoja moralinių argumentų), dabartinė situacija
- slegia “realiąją”, produktyviąją ekonomiką,
- yra techniškai neapginama/nestabili.
Pirmojo argumento daug aiškinti nereikia – visuomenė neturi nereikalingų resursų. Antras argumentas mažiau suvokiamas. Simon Johnson, What Next For Banks?
Just as global financial liberalization created the potential for capital to move violently across countries and greatly facilitated speculative attacks on currencies, so financial deregulation within the United States has made it possible for capital markets to attack – or, in less colorful terms, go short or place massive negative bets on – the credit of big banks and, in the latest developments, the ability of the government to bailout/rescue banks.
The latest credit default spreads data for the largest banks show a speculative run underway. As the system stabilizes, it becomes more plausible that a single big bank will fail or be rescued in a way that involves large losses for creditors. This would like trigger further speculative attacks on other banks, much as the shorting of countries’ obligations spread from Thailand to Indonesia/Malaysia and then to Korea in fall 1997.
The government’s own policies are facilitating these attacks, because as the Fed and Treasury make progress towards easing credit conditions, this makes it easier and cheaper for large hedge funds and others to take large short positions. And keep in mind the underlying loss of confidence is self-fulfilling: as you lose confidence, you want to go short, and selling the credit causes further loss of confidence – and banks are forced out of business.
(…) The continuing pressure on banks has nothing to do with populism and everything to do with the internal contradictions of the house of cards they built. Now they will scramble to limit short selling or find other emergency measures that will protect their credit. Such partial fixes would do nothing to stop the underlying deterioration of their credit; think about how countries facing currency attacks throw up futile defenses, try to change the rules, and squander their reserves on the way down.
You can see where this is going, but do not cheer. The likely result will be misery for many and further financial chaos around the world.
Šiuolaikiniė finansų sistema neturi imuniteto bankų panikai. Net pačių didžiausių, net valdžios remiamų. Užtenka pakankamam kiekiui sistemos dalyvių tai suvokti, ir finansinis sunaikinimas tampa save išpildančia pranašyste. Tai ir vyksta.
Panašūs (automatiškai atrinkti) įrašai:
- Trijų milijardų nepakaks
- G-20 bankininkai “pasitarė” su finansų ministrais ir nusprendė
- Siūlau neimprovizuoti
- Domino kaladėlė Lietuva
- Latvijos kairieji ėjo į rinkimus su labai progresyvia programa
Temos: Ekonomika · Žymos: ekonomistai, korupcija, prognozės